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Abstract: In the last two decades, many U.S. states introduced support policies to 
promote electricity generation from renewable energy sources. Renewable portfolio 
standards are their most popular policy choices to date. This paper tackles the question 
why some state legislators were front-running the trend of RPS implementation while 
others adopted policies just recently, and again others have not incentivized investment 
so far. In short, what drives states to support renewable energy?  
We base our empirical analysis on theoretical reasoning. First, we present an 
application of the common agency model developed by Dixit et al. (1997) to better 
understand the impact of special industrial interests on policy decision-making. Second, 
we compile data on financial contributions of conventional energy interests (CEI) and 
renewable energy interests (REI) to state-level policymakers between 1998 and 2006. 
Third, in a series of panel, hazard and tobit regressions, we test the impact of these 
financial contributions on (i) the probability of a state to adopt a RPS policy and (ii) on 
the stringency of the RPS. We also control for state effects, time trends, and a set of 
socio-economic and political covariates.  
Combining our empirical framework with the theoretical model produces key 
insights into U.S. state level energy policy making. First, CEI have donated more to 
state-level legislators affiliated with the Republican Party than to Democrats while 
contributions from REI went largely to the latter. Second, we reveal statistically 
significant links between the likelihood of RPS adoption and private interest 
contributions. Financial contributions from CEI have a negative impact on the 
likelihood of RPS adoption while REI contributions have a positive impact. Third, the 
estimates show a similar – albeit less significant – pattern on RPS stringency. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, many U.S. states introduced support policies to promote 
electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES-E). Renewable portfolio 
standards (RPS) are their most popular policy choices.  
A RPS policy requires utilities to produce a certain fraction, or “quota” of their 
total electricity supply from renewable energy sources. Most legislation allows trading 
of renewable energy certificates (REC) in-state or in larger REC-markets. Thus, utilities 
can either buy RES-E directly from RES-E producers or they compensate non-
compliance of the quota by trading REC. Most RPS policies include penalties to 
incentivize compliance. 
To date, 29 states employ a mandatory RPS while 7 other states have a voluntary 
RPS in place. Table 1 shows the timeline of RPS implementation from 1996 to 2010. In 
1996 only three states had implemented an RPS. In 2010 already 36 states supported 
RES-E generation by means of RPS policies.  
Table 1 - Years of RPS policy enactment at the U.S. state level from 1996 to 2010 
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Mandatory RPS (standard); voluntary RPS (italic), Source: DSIRE (2012). 
This paper tackles the question why some state legislators were front-running the trend 
while others adopted policies just recently, and again others have not incentivized 
investment so far. In short, what drives states to support renewable energy? 
 Previous studies shed light on an array of driving factors: geography (solar 
radiation, available land area, wind speed, conventional energy reserves etc.), 
economics (unemployment rate, disposable personal income, electricity price etc.), 
environmental protection (non-attainment area, critical air pollutants, greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions etc.), population (population size, educational level, citizens’ 
environmental preferences etc.), politics (party ideology, governorship, state-to-state-
learning etc.) and private interest (renewable energy interest groups, conventional 
energy interest groups, environmentalist groups, farmer lobbies etc.). Schmalensee 
(2011) nicely summarizes the political reasons to support renewables as energy security, 
green growth, and climate change.  
We would like to amend the discourse by introducing a theory-based 
explanation and a rigorous econometric quantification of the impact of special industrial 
interest on state level energy policy-making. Thus, this paper contributes to the 
discourse in three ways.  
First, we introduce a Public Choice model that elaborates the impact of private 
industrial interests on the willingness of policymakers to adopt RPS schemes. We call 
upon the common agency model developed by Dixit et al. (1997). We apply their model 
to the electricity market, and study the impact of special interest contributions on the 
probability that a politician will adopt support for RES-E.  
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Second, we quantify the campaign contributions from renewable and 
conventional energy industries that were donated to state level policymakers. Previous 
studies have used binary codes for the pure existence of lobby groups only. We are thus 
able to capture more of the heterogeneity among private interests that would otherwise 
be lost in a binary code, e.g. the financial fire-power they bring to bear in the struggle 
for the politicians’ attention.  
Third, we regress this more nuanced covariate on the likelihood of policy-
adoption. We employ time-series cross sectional (TSCS), proportional hazard, and tobit 
models in combination with different sections of our panel data. The hazard model 
regresses the contribution variables on a binary variable that equals 1/0 if a policy is/is 
not in place. Since the hazard model drops the state-years after a RPS has been adopted, 
the hazard model is best equipped to answer the first question: why do states adopt a 
RPS? The tobit regression regresses the covariate on the incremental share indicator 
(ISI) from Yin and Powers (2010) that quantifies the stringency of RPS policies. These 
censored regressions help to reveal the link between our covariate and the stringency of 
RPS policies, i.e. they focus on the state-years after a RPS has been enrolled. By means 
of the TSCS regressions, we show that un-censored models that run on the entire dataset 
and presumably skewed variables do not accurately capture the effect of financial 
contributions on RPS adoption and stringency.   
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature. Section 3 presents our application of the Dixit et al. (1997) agency model. 
Section 4 develops the covariate and provides the empirical framework. Section 5 
presents and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
For our theoretical model we draw upon literature that studies why certain (inefficient) 
economic policies are selected as a result of the political process of lobbying (see 
Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a survey). The concept of interest groups as a possible 
reason for policy bias has been introduced by Olson (1965), and has proven to be a 
major contribution to the traditional public choice literature. The author states that 
groups that have overcome the collective action problem - and thus have organized 
themselves - have more impact on policy than non-organized groups. This idea has been 
formalized in a growing literature on lobbying. An extensive overview on lobbying 
literature is found in Rodrik (1995) and Austen-Smith (1997).  
When several lobby groups, often with conflicting preferences, are affected by 
the action of a particular individual, the principal-agent interaction is formalized as a 
common agency model. In these models, special interest groups offer transferable utility 
(e.g. bribes, campaign contributions) to a government agent. In equilibrium, the agent 
efficiently aggregates the competing principals’ influences, absent transaction costs. 
Common agency models have been widely used to model political distortions in 
domains such as public finance (Dixit et al. 1997) and environmental policy making 
(Aidt 1998).  We apply the common agency model to the electricity market in presence 
of support for renewable energy. 
Concerning the empirical part of our paper, there is a lively discourse of 
econometric studies that assess the motivations of renewable energy support policies. 
Knittel's (2006) applies a hazard model. He finds that residential wealth, a proxy for 
residential interest group activity correlates positively with the adoption of electricity 
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market regulation. Lower levels of residential electricity penetration rates and lower 
electricity capacity also increase the likelihood of regulation. We learn from Knittel’s 
(2006) proportional hazard model. However, we do not use electricity market regulation 
but the adoption and stringency of RPS schemes as dependent variables.  
Huang et al. (2007) also run a logistic model on the U.S. states. Their results 
show that states with relatively high gross states products are more likely to implement 
a RPS. The probability of adoption also increases with population growth and the level 
of education of citizens. A RPS is less likely to be adopted if Republicans are holding a 
majority in state house and senate. High expenditure on conservation efforts of natural 
resources is also associated with lower RPS probabilities. We will use their dependent 
variable.   
Chandler (2009) specializes in inter-state learning. His major contribution is to 
show that states are more likely to adopt RPS policies (and other renewable energy 
policies) if neighboring states have a RPS in place already. He conclusively argues that 
policies can diffuse across state borders even when the political environment is 
ideologically distanced. Chandler (2009) also finds that wealth, measured by personal 
disposable income, is another driver of RPS adoption. We also use this covariate to 
capture the diffusion impact.  
Lyon and Yin (2010) build on the previous studies. They use a proportional 
hazard model like Knittel (2006) did and the dependent variable from Huang et al. 
(2007). In addition, they add variables that account for wind, biomass, and solar 
potentials. Lyon and Yin (2010) find that the unemployment rate and the percentage of 
natural gas generation have a negative impact on the odds of RPS adoption. In contrast, 
the existence of a staffed state chapter of the American Solar Energy Society (ASES), 
the percentage of Democrats in state legislation and a restructured electricity market 
elevate the likelihood of RPS adoption. Large wind and large solar potentials also make 
policymakers more willing to introduce a RPS. We follow Lyon and Yin (2010) by also 
calculating the odd ratios from the hazard model. 
Lyon and Yin (2010) are the first study that links interest groups to the 
likelihood of RPS adoption. However, they quantify the impact of an interest group 
only by means of a binary code for the presence of a ASES state chapter. The real 
impact varies across states and time together with the financial resources of interest 
groups. Thus, our paper contributes to the discourse by introducing financial 
contribution covariates as more accurate and fine-grained measures of interest group 
influence. Furthermore, Lyon and Yin (2010) only capture the solar lobby, represented 
by the ASES. The solar lobby, however, is a weak proxy for renewable energy interest 
groups since RPS policies favor more price competitive RES-E sources such as wind 
and biomass. Therefore, the ASES may not even have an interest in the adoption of a 
RPS since solar photovoltaic and solar thermal technologies may not be used to meet 
the RPS quota. Finally, Lyon and Yin (2010) miss out on the opposing site of the game. 
Conventional energy producers are affected by the introduction of a RPS and thus lobby 
against it. Our study also incorporates contributions from conventional energy interests.  
Delmas et al. (2011) is the most recent study on the U.S. sample. In a logistic 
model, they find that wind resources, solar resources, LCV Score, democrats in state 
legislation, income per capita, and the existence of state ASES chapters increase the 
probability of RPS adoption. Thus they also measure interest group influence by a 
dummy variable. Their regressions also present negative and significant impacts of 
biomass resources and the unemployment rate on the odds.  
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Jenner et al. (2012) were the first to apply this question to RES-E policy making 
at the EU country level. They find that the existence of solar industry associations has a 
positive effect on the willingness of policymakers to adopt feed-in-tariffs (FiT). By 
means of technology-specific tailoring of tariff size and contract duration, FiT policies 
support technologies at different levels of market competitiveness. In other words, solar 
energy, being rather expensive to produce, is supported by many FiT policies (Groba et 
al. 2011). In turn, solar associations have an interest in the introduction of FiT policies. 
However, Jenner et al. (2012) capture the impact of interest groups by a dummy that 
neglects the heterogeneity between interest groups, states and years. Our covariate 
captures this kind of financial heterogeneity. 
3. Theoretical model 
In our theoretical model, we apply the common agency model (Dixit et al., 
1997) to the electricity market. We use the model to study the impact of special interests 
on the level of support for renewable energy. Campaign contributions offered by the 
special interests create a political distortion, as the electorally motivated government 
agent exchanges these contributions for certain political favors. We proceed to show 
that campaign contributions are an important source of inefficiencies in support policies 
for renewable energy. 
3.1. The Economy  
We develop a stylized partial equilibrium model for a large, open economy, with two 
productive sectors: electricity ( )x  and a numéraire ( )y , and a distribution sector (D). 
Electricity is produced in two subsectors, one using fossil fuels (F) and the other using 
renewables (R) as energy input (both traded at the world market). In order to support the 
renewables reaching grid parity, a renewable portfolio standard is introduced in the 
electricity sector. We define   as the annual RPS fraction (or quota). Thus, 
for each unit of electricity generated,  ( )/ 1α α− certificates (REC) have to be provided. 
The REC price ( )cp  is determined on the REC market. It is partly determined by the 
target fraction .
1
 REC prices rise with increased RPS stringency if we assume that 
the current existing RES-E capacity does not meet . Per unit of output sold, the RES-
E producers receive the price of electricity on the market, plus an additional 
compensation for the certificates. We treat this compensation as a subsidy equivalent.
2
 
Production in the numéraire sector is driven by a CRS technology that only uses 
labor ( )l  as input factor. Labor mobility across sectors and profit maximization pin 
down the wage in the economy to w=1. Both the conventional and the renewable 
energy utility use three inputs: labor, industry specific capital in fixed supply ( )k  and 
energy inputs ( ),f r . Production is described by a neoclassical production function with 
constant returns to scale. Both electricity subsectors supply electricity in a competitive 
                                                        
1
 The scope of the scheme, the renewable technologies participating, and the price caps also affect the 
certificate price.  
2
 Assuming the RPS is mandatory, the subsidy equals the additional cost of RES-E production relative to 
conventional electricity production. 
α ( )0 1α≤ ≤
( )α
α
 6
market. We have the following restricted profit function for the conventional producers: 
( ), ,F Q w cpi , where Q is the wholesale electricity price and c the world market price for 
fossil fuels. The profit function is strictly convex and we have 0, 0
F F
Q cpi pi> < . The 
profit function for the renewables producers is ( ), , , ,R cQ w g ppi α , with g the world 
market price for renewables. Profits are strictly convex, and we have 
0, 0, 0R R RQ g αpi pi pi> < >  and 0c
R
ppi > . As levelized costs of RES-E generation exceed the 
levelized costs of electricity generation from conventional sources, we assume that 
g c> .3  The distribution sector buys electricity from both producers, and sells it on to 
the end-user as a homogenous product, in a competitive market. The distributing 
companies are obliged to provide the fraction α  of RES-E, which increases their costs. 
The distributor uses two input factors: labor and capital. The strictly convex profit 
function is: ( ), , , ,D cP Q w ppi α , with 0, 0, 0D D DQ P αpi pi pi< > <  and 0cRppi < . The 
combination of the competitive setting in the distribution sector and the RPS obligation 
results in a wedge between the wholesale and the retail price: the consumer pays a 
mark-up for electricity compared to a situation in absence of a RPS. We have that 
cP Q pα= + . Consequently, demand for electricity is lower with an RPS obligation. 
The economy has N consumers, who derive utility from consuming electricity 
(x) and the numéraire (y), and disutility from GHG and criteria air pollutants emitted by 
the conventional energy sector.
4
 The magnitude of these marginal emissions is fixed at a 
constant rate . Total emissions from the conventional energy sector are: .  
We define the harm caused by pollution as an increasing and convex function of 
total emissions: . We assume the utility of a consumer to be quasi-linear and 
additively separable, we have: ( ) ( )hU y u x H E= + − , with ' "0, 0u u> < . Each 
consumer receives an income from two sources. For in-elastically supplying her 
endowment of labor, 
hl , to the competitive labor market she gets a wage in return: hwl . 
Profits of the electricity sector are in hands of the consumers, who each own a share, 
,h iσ , of specific capital in sector i ( , ,i R F D= ).
5
 If we maximize utility subject to 
income, electricity price, and electricity production levels, we can derive the demand for 
electricity: ( )D P , with ( )' 0D P < . Demand for the numéraire is defined as follows: 
( ) ( )yD p I PD P= − . If we assume that ( ) 0yD p > , the wage rate is well defined. We 
have the following indirect utility function for consumer h: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
, , ,, , , , , , , , , , , ,
h F R D
c h h F h R c h D cV P Q c g p l Q c Q g p Q P p
u D P PD P H E
α σ pi σ pi α σ pi α= + + +
+ − −
 
Assuming an additive utilitarian social welfare function, we have: 
                                                        
3
 This is mainly due to renewables’ higher intermittency, higher specific upfront costs, lower overall load 
factor, additional transmissions costs, etc. 
4
 Acknowledging the broad spectrum of additional positive and negative externalities, for simplicity 
reasons, we limit our model to emissions. Further externalities such as energy security, the impact on job 
creation and job destruction, volatility and size of electricity prices, impacts in trade, etc. would only 
multiply the magnitude of our coefficients. Thus, our findings give a valid insight into the direction of the 
impact. The actual size of the impact is probably even higher than our conservative estimates though. 
5 Human capital, e.g. entrepreneurial skills: only useful in a specific sector (cf. Aidt 1998). 
( )ε E fε=
( )H E
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
, , , , , , , , , , , ,F R Dc c cSW P Q c g p L Q c Q g p Q P p
N u D P PD P NH E
α pi pi α pi α= + + +
 + − − 
 
3.2. The Political Process 
We consider a policymaker who must decide on whether or not to install a RPS in a 
certain year. The policymaker also sets the level of a RPS. The politician decides upon 
the optimal level of RES-E in the state economy in a given year, . If the existing 
level of RES-E capacity  is smaller thanα ∗  the politician will adopt a RPS.6 If 
α β∗ <  the politician will presumably not install a RPS. We model the decision making 
process on the optimal level of  as a common agency problem as did Dixit et al. 
(1997). The policymaker cares about social welfare, and collects private financial 
contributions during campaigning for office and the time being in office. These 
contributions will be used later on in an election, which is not modeled (cf. Aidt, 1998). 
The private industrial interests possibly affected by a RPS are willing to offer these 
contributions to influence the choice of the policymaker.
7
  
We consider functionally specialized interest groups, in the sense that they only 
care for one specific objective (cf. Aidt 1998). In our model, we allow for conventional 
energy interests (CEI) and renewable energy interests (REI). That means contributions 
from CEI (REI) represent a signal to the policymaker in support (opposition) of the 
adoption of a RPS if the state has not previously adopted a RPS. If a RPS is enacted 
already, contributions from CEI (REI) represent a signal to the policymaker in support 
(opposition) of increased stringency of the RPS.  
We study the interaction between these private industrial interests and the 
politician in a policy game that has two stages. In the first stage, each interest group 
non-cooperatively and simultaneously presents a binding contribution schedule. In the 
second stage, the politician chooses the level of RPS  so as to maximize a weighted 
sum of social welfare and the preferences of the private industrial interests that are 
represented by the contributions. This is because he wants to be re-elected, and the 
probability of re-election partly depends on aggregate campaign contributions and on 
social welfare. In other words, the policymaker is sensitive not only to the social 
welfare but also to financial contributions. Thus, the overall welfare maximization 
yields: 
 
where  represents the contributions from the special interests (l= CEI, REI). The 
weight  represents the policymaker’s benevolence towards the social 
welfare, the adverse 1    thus represents the benevolence towards the private 
                                                        
6 This level is given in our model, and depends on, amongst others, the level of natural resources in the 
economy, other support systems like tax cuts etc.  indicates that renewable electricity production 
is viable, even without the support of a RPS. 
7
 The private industrial interests are not necessarily collectively (e.g. industrial association, pressure 
group) organized, a ‘group’ can also consist of one individual. The connecting element lies in the shared 
target of supporting or opposing the adoption of a RPS.  
 
α ∗
( )β
α
( )α
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1P l l
l
W SW Cα λ α λ γ α= + − ∑
lC
( )0 1λ λ≤ ≤
0β >
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industrial interests. The weights  represent the relative influence of CEI vs. REI on 
the government. We assume and . This parameter represents the 
result of the competition (not modeled) between the two groups, as well as the 
preference of the policymaker towards either one of the interest group types. The 
weights are exogenous in our model and will remain exogenous in the empirical 
analysis as well. We focus on the outcome instead.  
The equilibrium of the game is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the 
contribution schedules and the chosen RPS policy. The derivation of the equilibrium in 
differentiable strategies follows Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Dixit (1996) and is 
left out. In addition, for simplicity, we only consider those equilibriums in truthful 
contribution schedules (cf. Aidt, 1998 and Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
8
 As a result, we 
can write the objective function of the policymaker as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1P l l
l
W SW Wα λ α λ γ α= + − ∑  
where  is the welfare of l: CEI, REI. The welfare function of the REI group (and thus 
its contribution schedule) is the sum of the objective functions of consumers that favor 
renewable energy, either because they own shares in the sector, or because they are part 
of an environmentalist group. The function is defined as: 
( ) ( ), RR h R R
h REI
W s NH Eα σ pi
∈
= −∑  
where Rs  is the share of environmentalists in the population. This welfare function 
represents the preferences of the median consumer with renewable energy interests. As 
we do not model the organization process of special interests, we can consider this 
welfare function as if it were that of one lobby group. The CEI group is interested in 
maximizing the profit of the conventional energy sector. Their welfare function is the 
sum of the objective functions of all individuals that actively favor conventional energy 
because they own shares in the sector. It is defined as: 
( ) , FF h F
h CEI
W α σ pi
∈
= ∑  
This welfare function represents the preferences of the median consumer with 
conventional energy interests. As we do not model the organization process of special 
interests, we can consider this welfare function as if it were that of one lobby group.  
If the policymaker is entirely benevolent to social welfare, the optimal level of 
α  maximizes social welfare, i.e. α  is at a level that balances social and private benefits 
and costs of RPS. The benevolent politician maximizes social welfare as defined in the 
welfare function. Solving the first order condition leads to an implicit solution for the 
politically optimal level of α , which we label as . The details of the calculations are 
provided in the Appendix. The policymaker compares this level of α ∗  to the existing 
level of RES-E capacity , and will decide to support RES-E through a RPS if 
                                                        
8
 A globally truthful contribution schedule of an interest group everywhere reflects the true preferences of 
an interest group (cf. Aidt 1998). This means that the contributions schedule equals the welfare of the 
interest group, minus a constant that distributes the rent between the politician and the interest group (we 
set this constant equal to zero – all rent goes to politician). 
lγ
{ }0,1lγ ∈ 1l
l
γ ≤∑
lW
α ∗
( )β
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α β∗ > . The objective function of the policymaker who is not only sensitive to social 
welfare, but also to contributions is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )max 1P R R F FW SW W W
α
α λ α λ γ α γ α= + − +    
Straightforward, the optimal level of α  now also depends on the relative size of the 
CEI and REI contributions, on the benevolence balance of the policymaker and on the 
relative assertiveness of CEI and REI on the decision making process. To study the 
effect of contributions from REI, we consider the following maximization issue for the 
policymaker: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),max 1 RP h R R
h REI
W SW s NH E
α
α λ α λ σ pi
∈
 
= + − − 
 
∑  
The policymaker will no longer opt for the socially efficient level . We find that the 
optimal support level for the RPS policy in this case, which we define as Rα , exceeds 
 (see Appendix). The politician compares the level of α  again to the existing 
capacity β  to decide whether or not to support RES-E. As Rα α ∗> , the chance of the 
policymaker supporting RES-E increases in the presence of renewable energy special 
interests. The effect of contributions from CEI is determined by looking at the following 
objective function for the policymaker: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,max 1 FP h F
h CEI
W SW
α
α λ α λ σ pi
∈
 
= + −  
 
∑  
Again, the socially efficient level  will no longer be chosen. In this scenario, the 
politician opts for a level  that is lower than  (see Appendix). The politician 
compares the level of α  again to the existing capacity β  to decide whether or not to 
support RES-E. As Fα α ∗< , the chance of the policymaker supporting RES-E 
decreases in the presence of conventional special interests. 
Applying the well-established Dixit et al. (1997) common agency model to the 
electricity market allows us to model how campaign contributions are an important 
source of inefficiencies in the support for renewable energy.  The next section will test 
the core hypothesis that policymakers are sensitive to CEI and REI contributions. We 
assume that CEI contributions have a negative effect on the probability of RPS adoption 
and on the stringency of the RPS while REI contributions come with positive impacts.  
4. Empirical Framework and Data 
From Section 3 we know that the policymaker is sensitive to the maximization of social 
welfare and possibly also to private interest contributions. Our empirical analysis 
intends to verify or falsify the hypothesis that policymakers in the real world actually 
respond to private interests. We measure the impact of private interest with a covariate 
that captures financial contributions from CEI and REI respectively.  
 If there is a significant positive or negative link between our covariates for CEI 
or REI and the dependent variable, the hypothesis is verified for our sample. If the 
regressions reveal a significant neutral link, the hypothesis is falsified. If there is no 
significant link, we can neither verify nor falsify the hypothesis.  
α ∗
α ∗
α ∗
Fα α ∗
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4.1. Dependent Variable 
In the subsequent empirical analysis, we will work with two different dependent 
variables. RPS Binary is a binary variable that indicates whether a RPS is enacted (1) or 
not (0). ISI is the incremental share indicator (ISI) from Yin and Powers (2010). The 
ISI represents “the mandated increase in renewable generation in terms of the 
percentage of all generation” (Yin and Powers, 2010: 1142). Thus it is a metric for 
policy stringency. The ISI is constructed as 
	 

	
  	
  	
		 
 
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with 	
 representing the yearly fraction as a percentage of RES-E to total electricity 
generation; 	
  representing the percentage of RES-E generation capacity that is 
legally eligible to meet 	
; 	
		  indicating the annual total electricity generation; 
and 
indicating the absolute RES-E generation capacity from previous years that is 
eligible to meet  	
.  
Data to construct RPS Binary has been provided by DSIRE (2012). Data for the 
ISI has been compiled from the EIA Electric Power Annual (2011). We use RPS Binary 
in the proportional hazard model. We use ISI in the tobit model. We first test both 
dependent variables in the fixed effects panel regression.  
4.2. Independent Variable 
Previous studies have mostly relied on binary codes that equal 1/0 if an interest group 
does/ does not exist in the particular state i in the given year t (Delmas et al., 2011; 
Jenner et al., 2012; Lyon and Yin, 2010). We argue that this approach neglects the 
important heterogeneity between different interests that results from differences in the 
magnitude of their contributions. In other words, “money matters”. The more financial 
“fire power” an industrial interest can spend, the better its chances to have an impact on 
the decision-making process.  
We measure the amount of annual contributions that have been made to 
politicians at the U.S. state level between 1998 and 2010. Data on the individual 
contributions has kindly been provided by the National Institute on Money in State 
Politics, a non-partisan, non-profit organization (visit their outstanding webpage at 
FollowTheMoney.org). Their dataset contains contributions to U.S. state level 
policymakers from 1989 to 2011. The data is comprehensive for all 50 U.S. states in 
1998 and following. 
From the total amount of individual contributions we filtered 473,747 
contributions that came from conventional and renewable energy industries as well as 
pressure groups that are closely related to energy and/ or environmental issues. These 
interests would be affected directly by the introduction of a RPS. We distinguish 
between branches we assume to favor the introduction of a RPS, e.g. alternative energy 
producers and environmental protection groups; and groups we expect to favor to not 
have a RPS adopted, e.g. oil, natural gas and coal related industries and pro-resource 
development groups.  
We assume contributions from conventional energy interests (we referred to 
them in Section 3 as “CEI”) to have a negative impact on the probability of a 
policymakers to adopt a RPS while the aggregated contributions from the cluster of 
 11 
renewable energy interest (“REI”) have a positive influence on the odds of adoption. 
Furthermore, we assume that CEI (REI) contributions have a positive (negative) effect 
on policy stringency. Figure 1 presents the development of CEI and REI contributions 
(in absolute terms) as an aggregate of all U.S. state level contributions from 1998 to 
2010 (NMISP 2011).  
Figure 1 – CEI and REI Contributions at the U.S. state level from 1998 to 2010 
 
Figure 1 shows that both REI and CEI contributions fluctuate and increase over time. 
The fluctuations can be explained by frequency of state level elections. Thus, Figure 2 
presents the years with gubernatorial elections (NCSL2011) and the total amount of 
contributions (NMISP 2011). 
Figure 2 – Total Contributions and Elections at the U.S. state level from 1998 to 
2010 
 
Since elections appear to affect both total and energy sector contributions, building the 
ratios for CEI and REI to total contributions is an adequate way to accurately capture 
the impact of contributions. Ratios also help to control for the inflation trend that affects 
both energy sector contributions and total contributions.  
Thus far, we described cross-state aggregates. However, there is quite some 
heterogeneity between states in the magnitude of both CEI and REI contributions. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of CEI contributions between 1998 and 2010 among the 
50 U.S. states. Figure 4 shows the distribution of REI contributions.  
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Figure 3 – Geographical Distribution of CEI Contributions at the U.S. state level 
 
Figure 4 – Geographical Distribution of REI Contributions at the U.S. state level
 
For our regressions, we use three kinds of covariates: Absolute contributions CEI-A and 
REI-A, the ratio of these contributions to the total contributions CEI-R and REI-R, and 
interaction terms. We build interaction terms for the ratios and the party affiliation of 
the governor. In addition, we interact the ratios with a lobby regulation index to 
evaluate the effect of lobby regulation on the assertiveness of the contributions. 
According to the theoretical model and what we just discussed along with Figures 1 and 
2, we argue that ratios are the best metric to capture the influence of contributions on 
the policymaker because ratios represent the relative importance of one private interest 
over others.  
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4.3. Controls 
Multiple aspects can determine the enactment and stringency of a policy. Our major 
interest lies in finding out to what extent private interest contributions drive these 
decisions. However, other variables also factor in the ultimate decision about enactment 
and stringency. In order to capture these influences, we control for a series of socio-
economic and political variables.   
Republican Governor (GOV-R) and Republicans in State Legislature (LEG-R). 
Party theory argues that the ideological background has an impact on policymakers’ 
decisions. The adoption of a renewable energy support scheme such as the RPS is a 
major decision in favor of state intervention into the electricity market. Following Lyon 
and Yin (2010) and Huang et al. (2007), we assume that Republican governors and 
Republicans in state legislature are more reluctant to introduce RPS schemes. The mean 
Voting Score published by the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) also shows that 
Democrats vote roughly 10 times more often in favor of environmental and climate 
policies than Republicans at the state level.  GOV-R is a binary code that equals “1” if 
the governor is affiliated with the Republican Party and “0” if the governor is a 
Democrat. LEG-R represents the percentage of Republican members of the state houses 
and senates. The variables are correlated. Thus we use GOV-R in our main model and 
LEG-R in robustness checks. We will also use party affiliation of the governor as an 
interaction term with our CEI-R and REI-R covariates.  
Public Opinion (PUB-R). Party affiliation is only one side of the story since 
there is considerable ideological heterogeneity within a party across states. For instance, 
Republican politicians in New England states tend to take more liberal or democratic 
positions than their colleagues in the Southern States. Similar to Lyon and Yin (2010), 
we capture the general political position of a state by the percentage of persons that 
describes themselves as “Republicans”.  
Neighboring states with RPS (N-RPS). The federalist political system of the U.S. 
fosters state-to-state learning. In the RPS case the diffusion of policies across 
neighboring states is of particular importance because regional renewable electricity 
certificate (REC) markets incentivize the adoption of RPS systems in recent years if 
neighboring states already institutionalized a REC market. Chandler (2009) found that 
the share of neighboring states that have a RPS in place positively affects the likelihood 
of adoption. We include Chandler’s variable and assume its coefficient will also be 
positive.  
State Income (INC) and Energy Sector Employment (E-EMPL). Public interest 
theory argues that policymakers are sensitive to the wealth of their constituents. Since 
the adoption of a RPS scheme brings energy capacities online that would not be price 
competitive in the absence of the policy, additional costs emerge. Utilities will forward 
these costs to the end-user. Policymakers in relatively poor states may be less willing to 
advocate the additional burden that comes from a RPS than policymakers in wealthier 
states. Knittel (2006) and Huang et al. (2007) found such a link. Therefore, INC 
represents the median income of a 4-person household. The share of mining and utility 
sector employment in total employment, E-EMPL, follows a similar rational. We expect 
policymaker in states with high mining and utility sector employment to be less 
motivated to adopt a RPS that could threaten these jobs. 
Non-Attainment Area Index (NAA). Public health benefits from the replacement 
of conventional energy sources by renewable energy sources because their generation 
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produces less toxic air pollutants and emissions. Lyon and Yin (2010) and Chandler 
(2009) found that policymakers in states where many people live in so-called non-
attainment areas are more likely to support a RPS. Therefore, we include the EPA 
(2011) data for local air pollutants per 2000 population. The ratio represents the level of 
exposure to critical air pollutants. NAA presumably increases the odds of RPS adoption.  
RES-E Capacity (RES-CAP). Existing renewable energy capacities make it 
easier for policymakers to support RES-E generation. One rational is that these 
technologies have already proven their market competitiveness. Another rational is that 
RPS can protect existing RES-E to stay in the market even when unconventional energy 
sources such as shale gas enter the market. Following Lyon and Yin (2010) we include 
the percentage of non-hydro RES-E in total electricity capacity. The variable is used in 
models with RPS Binary as the dependent variable. We drop RES-CAP if ISI is the 
dependent variable because, by design, the former is endogenous to the latter.  
Lobby Regulation Index (REG). The effectiveness of private interest groups to 
influence the decision making process is also affected by the receptiveness of the 
political system itself. Newmark (2005) constructed a lobby regulation index that 
captures the number of lobby regulations at state level. We took the 2003 score of this 
index which means the variable is time invariant. Controlling for it may result in lower 
coefficients for the other covariates because these kind of fixed effects take out parts of 
the distribution of the dependent variables. Thus we interact REG with the CEI-R and 
REI-R covariates. 
In a series of robustness checks we also tested a couple of additional control 
variables such as the percentage of GDP that is contributed by the energy and mining 
industries, greenhouse gas emissions per capita, population growth, solar irradiation and 
others. We do not include these controls because they intercorrelated with other 
variables and thus would have possibly biased the estimates.  
4.4. Data 
We compiled 1998-2010 panel data on RPS policies, the contributions, and most of the 
control variables for the U.S. 50 states sample. Contribution data has kindly been 
provided by the National Institute on Money in State Politics (NMISP), a non-partisan, 
non-profit organization. Other data has been compiled from the EIA (2011), EPA 
(2011), DSIRE (2012), BLS (2011), BEA (2011), and NCSL (2011). The public 
opinion dataset is private data from Harvard University. It ranges to 2006 only. Thus we 
limited the empirical framework to 2006. If comprehensive public opinion data is 
available in the future, we can easily extend the dataset by four years. In Table 2, the 
summary statistics of the dataset are presented. 
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Table 2 –  Summary Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Unit Source 
RPS Binary 650 0.15 0.36 0 1 Binary NMISP 2011 
ISI 650 1.16 4.46 0 32.10 % NMISP 2011 
REI-A 650 28.05 79.89 0 839.60 $1,000 NMISP 2011 
CEI-A 650 404.95 917.91 0 11144.14 $1,000 NMISP 2011 
REI-R 650 0.02 0.07 0 1.55 % NMISP 2011 
CEI-R 650 0.27 2.61 0 41.72 % NMISP 2011 
GOV-R 650 0.52 0.50 0 1 Binary NCSL 2011 
PUB-R 450 38.48 8.57 0 73.68 % private 
N-RPS 650 25.09 28.39 0 100.00 % DSIRE 2012 
INC 650 51.73 7.84 35.58 73.60 $1,000 BEA 2011 
E-EMPL 650 1.16 1.33 0 9.29 % BLS 2011 
NAA  650 0.36 0.58 0 2.41 % EPA 2011 
RES-CAP 650 4.12 4.94 0 27.59 % EIA 2011 
LEG-R 650 47.91 15.07 10 89.00 % NCSL 2011 
REG 650 10.34 3.12 1 17.00 Index Newmark 2005 
4.5. TSCS Model 
We first run preliminary times series cross-sectional regressions. A Hausman test rejects 
the null hypothesis. Thus, we incorporate state and year fixed effects. State effects 
control for any time constant characteristics such as the institutional environment or the 
RES-E potential. Time effects control for federal economic and policy impacts that are 
invariant to states. The model specification is written as: 
(I) MN	 
OPQ RSTUVWX
Y Q RZ YUVWX
Y Q R[\	 Q ]S^ Q ]Z^	 Q _`a 
where \	 is a suite of our controls; ^, ^	 represent the fixed effects; and b	 is an error 
term. MN	 takes the form of either RPS Binary or ISI. In some specifications, cd
 and 
ed are replaced with  cdf and edf or interaction terms.  
We expect this linear model to actually be inappropriate for our first question 
regarding what drives states to adopt a RPS policy. First, our dependent variable RPS 
Binary is a binary code and not normally distributed. Second, we are actually only 
interested in the state-years prior to the enactment of a RPS since we want to estimate 
the factors that lead up to the decision. Thus, the estimates are biased by state-years 
after the policy has been enacted. It is also important to exclude state-years after policy 
adoption because RPS policies may have an effect on the contributions of interest 
groups, i.e. the independent variable may well be endogenous to the dependent variable 
after it turns ”1”. 
4.6. Hazard Model 
Hazard modeling (Kiefer 1988), which is commonly applied in labor market economics 
and public health studies, is a more appropriate technique to solve these kinds of 
problems. First, the dependent variable is defined as the conditional probability 
P1=P(t,X,Z) of a state to adopt regulation in a certain year, given the state did not adopt 
such regulation before: P0=1–P(t,X,Z) (Jenkins 1995). Second, the model drops the 
state-years in the first year after policy enactment. Thus, it is more robust against the 
endogeneity bias. By only using the state-years leading up to the decision, the 
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proportional hazard model specifically addresses our first question of what drives states 
to adopt a RPS. The logistic model allows transferring the coefficients into odd ratios. 
Thus, the model estimates the relative effect of a mean unit change on the probability of 
a state adopting a RPS in year t given that the state has not adopted a RPS before. The 
logit specification is written as follows:  
(II) ghijklPr mS/mPo 
 Pk Q RSTUVWX
Y Q RZ YUVWX
Y Q Rp\	 Q q Q b	 
where Pk is the baseline hazard of RPS adoption only determined by time; CEI and 
REI are the contribution ratios; \	 is a suite of political, energy, environmental, and 
socio-economic controls expected to have an impact on RPS adoption; q is the state-
specific random-intercept that covers the otherwise omitted time-constant state impacts 
that cause some states to generally be more likely to adopt RPS schemes than others; 
b	 is the error term. 
A robustness option excludes the 5% outliers at the left and right hand side of 
the distribution. We expect this model to generate more meaningful results than the 
TSCS model since it uses the probability of policy adoption as the dependent variable 
and excludes state-years after policy adoption. 
Figure 5 presents the Kaplan-Meier hazard function. The exponential slope of 
the curve illustrates the increasing willingness of policymakers across states to adopt a 
RPS policy. In 2010, the curve ends at 72%. The remaining 28% represent the 14 states 
that have not yet implemented a RPS (see Table 1).  
Figure 5 –  Kaplan-Meier Hazard Function 
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4.7. Censored Model 
The hazard model investigates the link between our covariates and the likelihood of 
RPS adoption. As soon as an RPS is adopted, the hazard model drops the data points. In 
order to analyze the effect of our covariate on the policy stringency after the RPS has 
been enrolled; we apply a tobit regression model to the state-years that have been 
dropped by the hazard model. It allows using a stringent metric, the ISI (Yin and Powers 
2009), as the dependent variable. The reason for applying a tobit model lies in the fact 
that the ISI has a lower threshold namely zero. That means that the distribution of the 
ISI is limited to positive values down to the threshold of zero.  
(III) 	 
 Pk Q RSTUVWX
Y Q RZ YUVWX
Y Q Rp\	 Q q Q b	 
as specified for the logistic regression. The sample of the tobit regression comes with a 
lower limit of 0.001 for the ISI. The reason for this censoring is to only capture the 
observations that have a RPS in place already.  
5. Empirical Findings 
A glance at descriptive statistics provides insight into the distribution of the 
contributions. Figure 6 shows a simple two-party comparison of the 1998-2010 
aggregate of CEI-A and REI-A contributions. CEI have donated two to three time more 
state-level legislators affiliated with the Republican Party than to Democrats. In 
contrast, REI contributions to Democrats are roughly three times higher than to 
Republicans. This pattern holds true in absolute and per seat terms. We will use 
interaction terms and control variables to capture this party-bias.  
Figure 6 – Absolute CEI and REI contributions to Republicans and Democrats 
 
This imbalance verifies the hypothesis that private industrial contributions tend to be 
donated to likeminded politicians. The LCV score showed that Democrats are more 
likely to endorse renewable energy and climate policies than Republicans. REI 
contributors appear to know that and thus support Democrats to much larger extents 
than Republicans. The same logic holds true for CEI contributors and Republicans. 
Since Republicans are generally more likely to oppose environmental regulation, 
indicted by a low mean LCV score, CEI contributors support them in their stance 
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against market intervention. Both findings come without much surprise. However, it 
shows that we need to control for party bias, and it verifies that party affiliation is a 
major driver of contributions in the first place.  
We now go one step further and evaluate the impact of CEI and REI 
contributions on the willingness of policymakers to enact a RPS. Table 3 presents the 
results of our simple time series cross-sectional regression model (I). It does not reveal 
significant connections between CEI or REI contributions and the dependent variables 
RPS Binary or ISI.  
Table 3 – Times Series Cross-Sectional Regression Results  
 RPS Binary ISI 
 X_B_1 X_B_2 X_B_3 X_B_4 X_I_1 X_I_2 X_I_3 X_I_4 
REI-A 0.005    0.089    
0.005    0.093    
CEI-A -0.001    -0.030    
0.011    0.219    
REI-R  -0.003    -0.004   
 0.002    0.025   
CEI-R  -0.000    -0.002   
 0.001    0.009   
REI-R x GOV-D   -0.001    0.042  
  0.003    0.066  
CEI-R x GOV-D   -0.000    -0.003  
  0.000    0.007  
REI-R x GOV-R   -0.004**    -0.004  
  0.002    0.037  
CEI-R x GOV-R   -0.000    0.000  
  0.000    0.004  
REI-R x REG    -0.002    -0.002 
   0.002    0.018 
CEI-R x REG    -0.000    -0.002 
   0.001    0.009 
GOV-R  -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.007 0.304 0.298 0.314 0.286 
0.015 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.285 0.310 0.318 0.312 
PUB-R -0.073 -0.092 -0.092 -0.095 0.298 0.067 0.106 0.010 
0.067 0.082 0.082 0.083 0.967 1.187 1.171 1.202 
N-RPS 0.037 0.033 0.034 0.032 0.937 0.999 1.004 0.981 
0.036 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.742 0.800 0.803 0.800 
INC 0.107 0.096 0.100 0.089 1.431 1.888 1.959 1.749 
0.153 0.153 0.156 0.151 3.489 3.457 3.458 3.437 
E-EMPL -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 0.075 0.062 0.068 0.057 
0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.381 0.427 0.423 0.432 
NAA  0.018 0.020* 0.019 0.021* 0.186 0.158 0.156 0.170 
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.289 0.279 0.280 0.277 
RES-CAP -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006     
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010     
constant -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.221 -0.266 -0.276 -0.250 
0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.341 0.342 0.339 0.342 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 
R-Square 0.1683 0.1696 0.1713 0.1717 0.4085 0.3931 0.3937 0.3954 
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
 
We expected the lack of significance because RPS Binary is a non-normally distributed 
dummy and it continues to remain in the sample after the RPS is enacted.  
The proportional hazard model uses the probability of RPS adoption as the 
dependent variable. Straightforward, the hazard model drops the data points after the 
RPS has been adopted since these values would otherwise bias the estimates. As argued 
above, it is crucial to exclude state-years after RPS enactment because RPS policies 
 19 
may have a reversed effect on the contributions of interest groups, i.e. the independent 
variable may well be endogenous to the dependent variable if it remains in the sample 
after having switched from “0” to “1”. 
We perform a Durbin–Wu–Hausman to test for endogeneity, as recommended 
by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). The result verifies the hypothesis that REI and 
CEI contributions are endogenous to both dependent variables. That means REI and 
CEI contributions are affected by the adoption and stringency of a RPS. 
Interestingly, R-Square as a measure of model determination increases by the 
factor of two when we use the ISI as dependent variable. Yin and Powers’s (2009) 
incremental share indicator is much more normally distributed than the RPS Binary. 
However, the ISI consists of only 129 data points that are not zero and is still strongly 
left-tailed. The tobit model excludes these state-years in which no RPS is in place by a 
lower limit. The tobit model should thus produce more significant results.  
5.1. What Drives the Adoption of a RPS? 
Table 4 presents the results of the proportional hazard model (II). The estimation 
investigates the drivers of policy adoption which as considered in the first research 
question. Absolute contributions do not relate significantly to RPS Binary. We argued 
above that state characteristics such as the size or gubernatorial elections impact 
absolute values. Thus we should use ratios.  
The ratios REI-R and CEI-R verify our initial theoretical hypothesis: REI-R has 
a positive impact on the probability of RPS adoption while CEI-R has a negative 
impact. More specifically, an increase of REI-R by one standard deviation increases the 
probability of RPS adoption by 65%. An increase of CEI-R by one standard deviation 
decreases the odds of RPS adoption by 33%. Both links are highly significant.  
Referring to our theoretical assumptions, we argue that policymakers are 
sensitive to private interest contributions. They know that REI benefit from a RPS while 
CEI prefer to keep conventional energy capacities online. Thus, policymakers factor the 
relative contributions of CEI and REI into their decision making process. They are less 
willing to adopt a RPS if CEI contributions are high. In contrast, they endorse such 
policy if REI contributions are high. Of course, other aspects also determine the 
ultimate decision and we will discuss them next. However, the hazard model showed 
that CEI and REI contributions do make a difference at a statistically significant level.  
The GOV-D and GOV-R interaction terms reveal an interesting pattern. First, 
REI-R has a significant positive (64%) effect on the odds if there is a democratic 
governor in office. In other words, REI contributions work if there is a presumably 
likeminded (see LCV Score discussion above) governor in office. However, if the 
governor is a Republican, he or she can veto the adoption of a RPS. That may explain 
why REI-R spending does not have a significant effect on RPS adoption if a Republican 
is governor. Another reason can be that Democrats receive significant REI contributions 
(see Figure 5) while the amount that is donated to Republicans is just too small.  
Second, CEI-R has a significant negative (-24%) effect on RPS adoption if the 
governor is a Democrat and a significant negative (-100%) effect on RPS adoption if the 
governor is a Republican. Therefore, CEI contributions decrease the likelihood of RPS 
adoption regardless of the party affiliation of the governor. However, the effect of CEI-
R is much larger if there is a Republican in office than if a Democrat is governor. In 
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other words, CEI contributions de-motivate politician across the spectrum to adopt a 
RPS. CEI contributions to politicians in states with a Republican governor seem to be 
especially effective.  
The REG interaction terms show that the level of lobby regulation as quantified 
by Newmark’s (2005) index, does not largely affect the size of the coefficients. A 
technical reason is that REG vary across states only. Nevertheless, this model receives 
the lowest AIC and BIC scores among all models. These scores show that interacting 
the REG variable with the CEI and REI contributions increases the overall fit of the 
model. The REG thus captures otherwise omitted state specific characteristics that are 
not captured by the state clusters already. A polity reason can be that the number of 
lobby regulations does not largely decrease the effectiveness of CEI and REI lobbying.  
Table 4 – Hazard Model Results – Coefficients and Odd-Ratios 
 RPS Binary 
 H_B_1 H_B_2 H_B_3 H_B_4 
REI-A 0.097 10%       
0.094        
CEI-A -0.135 -13%       
0.222        
REI-R   0.499*** 65%     
  0.178      
CEI-R   -0.408*** -33%     
  0.151      
REI-R x GOV-D     0.492*** 64%   
    0.162    
CEI-R x GOV-D     -0.281*** -24%   
    0.095    
REI-R x GOV-R     -0.069 -7%   
    0.149    
CEI-R x GOV-R     -7.698* -100%   
    4.451    
REI-R x REG       0.450*** 57% 
      0.139  
CEI-R x REG       -0.423*** -34% 
      0.136  
GOV-R  -0.647 -48% -0.658 -48% -0.210 -19% -0.656 -48% 
0.449  0.462  0.600  0.457  
PUB-R -5.047** -99% -5.115** -99% -4.946** -99% -5.019** -99% 
2.188  2.065  2.295  2.071  
N-RPS -0.400 -33% -0.416 -34% -0.437 -35% -0.382 -32% 
0.384  0.378  0.385  0.383  
INC -0.455 -37% -0.129 -12% 0.001 0% 0.093 10% 
4.692  4.573  4.736  4.661  
E-EMPL -0.668 -49% -0.701 -50% -0.380 -32% -0.604 -45% 
0.890  0.928  0.806  0.864  
NAA  0.720*** 106% 0.748*** 111% 0.682*** 98% 0.758*** 113% 
0.263  0.250  0.253  0.260  
RES-CAP -0.131 -12% -0.144 -13% -0.144 -13% -0.146 -14% 
0.272  0.289  0.270  0.295  
Y1998 omitted omitted omitted omitted 
        
Y1999 omitted omitted omitted omitted 
        
Y2000 0.035 4% 0.005 0% -0.017 -2% -0.031 -3% 
0.660  0.633  0.658  0.645  
Y2001 0.093 10% 0.061 6% 0.033 3% 0.024 2% 
0.672  0.643  0.660  0.653  
Y2002 0.086 9% 0.035 4% 0.002 0% -0.033 -3% 
0.657  0.598  0.603  0.597  
Y2003 0.220 25% 0.177 19% 0.160 17% 0.139 15% 
0.616  0.586  0.610  0.598  
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Y2004 0.236 27% 0.199 22% 0.166 18% 0.168 18% 
0.603  0.581  0.606  0.591  
Y2005 0.289 33% 0.256 29% 0.224 25% 0.222 25% 
0.588  0.563  0.585  0.571  
Y2006 0.367 44% 0.342 41% 0.307 36% 0.307 36% 
0.584  0.563  0.584  0.571  
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 350 350 350 350 
Correctly classified 93.43% 93.66% 93.37% 93.08% 
Pseudo  
R-Square 
0.400 0.411 0.420 0.421 
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
 
The models classified more than 93% of all observations correctly. Pearson’s goodness-
of-fit chi-squared tests are not statistically significant. We conclude that the model fits 
well (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). The Pseudo R-Square that we reported at the end of 
the table is also considerably high. The estimations explain 40% and more of the 
information in the data. 
 The baseline shows that the general probability of RPS adoption has been mostly 
increasing over time. While the probability increases slightly up to 2002, there is a 
sudden increase in 2003. Afterwards, the baseline stabilizes again. Without drifting into 
speculations, one could argue that 2002 and 2003 were very special years for the U.S. 
energy landscape. In 2002, the 107
th
 Congress debated the federal “Energy Policy Act 
of 2002” as a bundle of measures against the steady increase in oil prices. In 2003, it 
adopted the “Clear Skies Act of 2003”. In the same year, the Northeastern blackout left 
45 million U.S. Americans without electricity. California had just ended its energy 
crisis and the Enron scandal began to surface. These and other cross-state effects could 
have contributed to the jump of the baseline in 2003.  
 A final glance at the suite of controls provides two robust results. First, a 
Republican leaning public opinion decreases the chance of RPS adoption. Thus, 
policymakers are sensitive to their constituency’s ideological stance. Second, states with 
large non-attainment areas are more likely to implement a RPS. Public health issues 
seem to drive the energy transition. Lyon and Yin (2010) also found a positive but 
insignificant link between the NAA Index and RPS adoption. The other control variables 
do not turn out to be at a statistically significant level. 
5.2. What Drives the Stringency of a RPS? 
The tobit model concentrates on the state-years in which there is a RPS in place. The 
second research question asked for the determinants of policy stringency, which we 
quantify by means of the incremental share indicator (Yin and Powers 2009). The 
regression output in Table 5 shows that absolute contributions do not have a statistically 
significant impact on the dependent variable. However, as seen before in the hazard 
model, the relative contributions come at significant levels. We verify the hypothesis 
that REI contributions have a positive impact on the stringency of RPS schemes while 
CEI contributions appear to make them weaker.  The effect is similar if the governor is 
a Democrat, while the significances disappear if a Republican is in office. In the fourth 
specification we interact the CEI and REI ratios with the REG index that represents the 
number of lobbying regulations. We find that CEI contributions keep their significant 
negative impact while REI contributions lose the significance.  
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What does that mean? We argue that high REI contributions motivate 
policymakers to implement a stronger RPS. As a result, more RES-E needs to be 
produced to meet the RPS requirement. More RES-E generation benefits the 
constituency of REI interests. Vice versa, more CEI contributions tend to motivate 
politicians to implement a weaker RPS. As a consequence, more conventional energy 
can remain in the portfolio. This is a benefit for the CEI. The overall effects seem to be 
driven by states with a Democratic governor and if there are only few lobby regulations 
in place. The absence of significant coefficients in the opposing scenarios (Republican 
governor, high REG index) does not indicate that these situations are not sensitive to 
contributions. The signs are still intuitive but the lack of significance does not allow for 
a solid interpretation.  
The suite of controls behaves similar to the hazard model. A Republican leaning 
public opinion makes RPS policies, once implemented, less stringent. In contrast, public 
health costs, caused by people living in non-attainment areas, have a positive effect on 
the stringency of RPS policies. Both links verify our hypothesis while the remaining 
controls turn out to be insignificant. The baseline is different to the hazard baseline. 
While the hazard baseline sharply increased in 2003, the tobit baseline that captures the 
underlying trend in the stringency of RPS policies remains stable. One reason is that the 
majority of RPS policies have been enacted after 2003, the period that is mostly 
captured by the tobit model. Another reason can be that politicians react to cross-state 
impacts mainly by policy-making and less by policy-redesigning.  
Table 5 – Tobit Regression Results 
 ISI 
 T_I_1 T_I_2 T_I_3 T_I_4 
REI-A 0.155    
0.147    
CEI-A -0.064    
0.193    
REI-R  0.228*   
 0.128   
CEI-R  -0.016**   
 0.008   
REI-R x GOV-D   0.189*  
  0.113  
CEI-R x GOV-D   -0.011*  
  0.007  
REI-R x GOV-R   -0.019  
  0.079  
CEI-R x GOV-R   -0.006  
  0.004  
REI-R x REG    0.217 
   0.140 
CEI-R x REG    -0.017* 
   0.009 
GOV-R  -0.726 -0.755 -0.720 -0.743 
0.517 0.548 0.556 0.541 
PUB-R -1.929* -1.982* -1.984* -1.936* 
1.005 1.162 1.160 1.146 
N-RPS -0.241 -0.301 -0.296 -0.292 
0.821 0.869 0.867 0.863 
INC 1.493 1.524 1.589 1.458 
1.900 1.938 1.946 1.918 
E-EMPL 0.109 0.089 0.085 0.092 
0.349 0.393 0.395 0.389 
NAA  0.584* 0.631** 0.615** 0.634** 
0.304 0.298 0.298 0.297 
Y1998 omitted omitted omitted omitted 
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Y1999 0.068 0.066 0.060 0.065 
 0.059 0.087 0.085 0.087 
Y2000 0.128 0.125 0.120 0.124 
 0.108 0.138 0.135 0.137 
Y2001 0.125 0.127 0.122 0.125 
 0.124 0.154 0.151 0.153 
Y2002 0.140 0.149 0.147 0.147 
 0.134 0.161 0.160 0.159 
Y2003 0.182 0.183 0.181 0.181 
 0.151 0.182 0.181 0.181 
Y2004 0.201 0.199 0.198 0.195 
 0.148 0.180 0.179 0.177 
Y2005 0.191 0.194 0.191 0.193 
 0.151 0.180 0.178 0.179 
Y2006 0.190 0.211 0.209 0.209 
 0.154 0.184 0.183 0.183 
Sigma 0.391*** 0.396*** 0.396*** 0.396*** 
0.093 0.096 0.096 0.095 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 129 129 129 129 
Pseudo R-Square 0.426 0.387 0.403 0.397 
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
 
The sample size is very small. Future studies will certainly make more accurate 
estimations because they can work with an increasing number of state-years that have a 
RPS in place. However, our estimates are robust across model specification. The Pseudo 
R-Square is lower than in the hazard model but still considerably high.  
6. Conclusion 
This article combined theoretical reasoning and empirical analysis. We applied the 
common agency model developed by Dixit et al. (1997) to the puzzle of renewable 
energy policy making. Henceforward we elaborated model specifications that explained 
how the decisions of policymakers (i) to enact a RPS and (ii) to set the stringency of the 
RPS after enactment are driven by both social welfare considerations and financial 
contributions from private industrial interests.  
We went on to quantify the financial contributions by conventional energy 
interests (CEI) and renewable energy interests (REI) that were donated to U.S. state-
level policymakers between 1998 and 2010. We found that CEI contribute more to 
Republicans than to Democrats while REI contributions are mostly given to Democrats.  
By means of a proportional hazard model, we revealed statistically significant 
links between the contributions and the likelihood of a state to adopt a RPS. In short, 
CEI contributions have a negative impact on the probability of RPS adoption while REI 
contributions have a positive impact. We conclude that policymakers are sensitive to 
private interest contributions. REI contributions signal support for a RPS while CEI 
contributions indicate opposition. We assume that policymakers know that REI benefit 
from a RPS while CEI prefer its absence. Thus, the hazard model showed that this 
presumable connection stands up to empirical scrutiny. Public health issues, proxied by 
the EPA’s non-attainment area index, also have a driving effect on the likelihood of 
RPS adoption. On the other hand, the odds are also affected by public opinion. The 
impact of our control for a Republican leaning public option turned out to be negative.  
By means of a tobit regression model, we revealed similar but less significant 
links. After a RPS is implemented, REI contributions appear to have a positive impact 
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on the stringency of the policy. In contrast, CEI contributions come with a negative 
impact. The same controls, public health and public opinion, remain robust for all 
model specifications.  
From a theoretical perspective the results verify our key hypothesis.  They prove 
that policymakers set the optimal level of RES-E not only by maximizing benefits over 
social welfare but they also integrate financial contributions from private industrial 
interests. From an empirical perspective the results show that policymakers pay back the 
financial contributions by means of policy choices and – albeit limited – also by policy 
stringency. Future studies should not rely on binary codes to assess the impact of 
private interests anymore but should use more nuanced indicators such as our financial 
contributions. 
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8. Appendix 
 
The FOC of the benchmark case (no lobbying) implicitly defines the optimal level α ∗ : 
( ) ( ) ( )( )0 R F DSW NH E NPx P N u x Pα α α α α αpi pi piα
∂
 = = − − + + +  ∂
 
The first three terms are positive: the profits for the renewables producers increase, 
pollution decreases and utility of consuming the numéraire increases with an increase in 
α . The other terms in the expression are negative. The profits in the fossil fuel and 
distribution sector decrease as well as the demand for electricity, so that utility of 
consuming electricity is lower, when the RPS obligation strengthens. The optimal level 
of renewables under the RPS, α ∗ , is defined by equating these marginal benefits and 
marginal costs. The objective function of the policymaker that includes campaign 
contributions from the renewables interest group has the following FOC: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ),
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This condition implicitly defines the optimal level of the portfolio standard in presence 
of influence from the renewables interests. Marginal benefits of increasing the level of 
the standard are larger compared to the benchmark case, which allows us to conclude 
that the optimal level of the standard is larger than α ∗ , we have Rα α ∗> . The FOC for 
the objective function where the policymaker includes campaign contribution from the 
conventional interests is as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ,
0
1
R F D
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h F
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NH E NPD P N u D Pα α α α α α
α
λ pi pi pi
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∈
∂   = = − − + + +   ∂
 
+ −  
 
∑
 
This expression implicitly defines 
Fα , the optimal standard in presence of the 
conventional interest group. As the marginal costs of increasing the standard exceed the 
marginal benefits, the policymaker maximizes his objective function by imposing a 
level that is lower than in the benchmark, so we have Fα α ∗< .  
 
